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1. Introduction   
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of mostly tiny, resource-constraint, simple sensor 
nodes, which communicate wirelessly and form ad hoc networks in order to perform some 
specific operation. Due to distributed nature of these networks and their deployment in 
remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely 
affect their proper functioning. Simplicity in WSN with resource constrained nodes makes 
them very much vulnerable to variety of attacks. The attackers can eavesdrop on its 
communication channel, inject bits in the channel, replay previously stored packets and 
much more. An adversary can easily retrieve valuable data from the transmitted packets 
that are sent (Eavesdropping). That adversary can also simply intercept and modify the 
packets’ content meant for the base station or intermediate nodes (Message Modification), or 
retransmit the contents of those packets at a later time (Message Replay). Finally, the 
attacker can send out false data into the network, maybe masquerading as one of the 
sensors, with the objectives of corrupting the collected sensors’ reading or disrupting the 
internal control data (Message Injection). Securing the WSN needs to make the network 
support all security properties: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability. 
Attackers may deploy a few malicious nodes with similar or more hardware capabilities as 
the legitimate nodes that might collude to attack the system cooperatively. The attacker may 
come upon these malicious nodes by purchasing them separately, or by "turning" a few 
legitimate nodes by capturing them and physically overwriting their memory. Also, in some 
cases colluding nodes might have high-quality communications links available for 
coordinating their attack. The sensor nodes may not be tamper resistant and if an adversary 
compromises a node, it can extract all key material, data, and code stored on that node. As a 
result, WSN has to face multiple threats that may easily hinder its functionality and nullify 
the benefits of using its services. These threats can be categorized as follows: 
• Common attacks 
• Denial of service attack 
• Node compromise 
• Impersonation attack 
• Protocol-specific attacks 
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The ad hoc or infrastructure less feature brings a great challenge to WSN security as well. 
For example, the dynamics of the whole network inhibits the idea of pre-distribution of a 
shared key between the base station and all sensors. Several random key pre-distribution 
schemes have been proposed in the context of symmetric encryption techniques (Chan, et al. 
(2003), Liu, et al. (2005)). In the context of applying public-key cryptography techniques in 
sensor networks, an efficient mechanism for public-key distribution is necessary as well. In 
the same way that distributed sensor networks must self-organize to support multi-hop 
routing, they must also self-organize to conduct key management and building trust relation 
among sensors. If self-organization is lacking in a sensor network, the damage resulting 
from an attack or even the hazardous environment may be devastating. Since WSN is a 
wireless service-oriented infrastructure, one of the most problematic attacks that it may face 
is the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. A DoS attack on WSN may take several forms: node 
collaboration, in which a set of nodes act maliciously and prevent broadcast messages from 
reaching certain section(s) of the sensor network; jamming attack, in which an attacker jams 
the communication channel and avoids any member of the network in the affected area to 
send or receive any packet; and exhaustion of power, in which an attacker repeatedly 
requests packets from sensors to deplete their battery life. Newsome et al. describe the Sybil 
attack as it relates to wireless sensor networks (Newson, et al. 2004). Simply put, the Sybil 
attack is defined as a “malicious device illegitimately taking on multiple identities” 
(Newson, et al. (2004)). It was originally described as an attack able to defeat the 
redundancy mechanisms of distributed data storage systems in peer-to-peer networks. In a 
nutshell, the security vulnerability of a WSN can be listed as: 
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
• Link layer attacks 
• Network layer attacks 
• Transport layer attacks 
• Link and physical layer attacks 
Apart from security concern, privacy preservation in WSN is a big challenge. The explosive 
growth and advancement of the information age, data collection and data analysis have 
exploded both in size and complexity. This in turn has impacted on the privacy preservation 
of the data of individual users or the network itself. Privacy in our context can be defined as 
the control over access to information about oneself. Privacy is also the limited access to a 
person or a process and to all the features related to the person. Privacy preservation is 
important from both individual as well as organizational perspectives. There are three types 
of privacy threats. If an adversary can determine the meaning of a communication exchange 
because of the existence of a message and the context of the situation, there is a content 
privacy threat. If an adversary is able to deduce the identities of the nodes involved in a 
communication, there is an identity privacy threat. And if the adversary is able to infer the 
physical location of a communication entity or to approximate the relative distance to that 
entity, there is a location privacy threat.  
In this book chapter, more emphasis will be given to privacy issues. It is understood that 
good amount of research works are directed (Karlof, et al. (2003), Law, et al. (2006), Gaubatz, 
et al. (2005) towards solving the problems of WSN security, whereas lesser effort have been 
put towards mitigating the problems related to WSN privacy. In fact, with the advent of the 
concept ubiquitous computing (Weiser, et al. (1991)), privacy becomes as important as 
security. So, we mainly focus on WSN privacy issues and highlight the WSN security in 
brief considering the large volume of work has been already done. 
 
2. WSN Security 
WSNs provide unique opportunities of interaction between computing devices and their 
environment. The adhoc nature and wireless vulnerability make WSN a soft target for 
security attacks. In order to understand the security aspects of WSN, we provide a brief 
description of the different attacks and then present the possible solutions. First, we find out 
the requirements of WSN security. Then we present some of the typical attacks on WSN 
security and lastly we describe some well-known mechanisms for preventing some the 
attacks.  
 
2.1 WSN requirements 
WSN can be considered as a highly distributed database with wireless links. Security goals 
for distributed databases are very well studied. The data should be accessible only to 
authorized users (confidentiality), the data should be genuine (integrity), and the data 
should be always available on the request of an authorized user (availability). All these 
requirements also apply to WSNs and their users. Data confidentiality is the most important 
issue in network security. The objective of confidentiality is required in sensors environment 
to protect information travelling among the sensor nodes of the network or between the 
sensors and the base station from disclosure. With the implementation of confidentiality, an 
adversary may be unable to steal information. However, this doesn’t mean the data is safe. 
The adversary can change the data, so as to send the sensor network into disarray. For 
example, a malicious node may add some fragments or manipulate the data within a packet. 
This new packet can then be sent to the original receiver. Data loss or damage can even 
occur without the presence of a malicious node due to the harsh communication 
environment. Thus, data integrity ensures that any received data has not been altered in 
transit. Authentication in sensor networks is essential for each sensor node and base station 
to have the ability to verify that the data received was really sent by a trusted sender or not. 
This authentication is needed during the clustering of sensor node in WSN. We can trust the 
data sent by the nodes in that group after clustering. Integrity controls must be implemented 
to ensure that information will not be altered in any unexpected way. Many sensor 
applications such as pollution and healthcare monitoring rely on the integrity of the 
information to function with accurate outcomes. Secure management is needed at base 
station, clustered nodes, and protocol layer in WSN. Because security issues like key 
distribution to sensor nodes in order to establish encryption and routing information need 
secure management. Even if confidentiality and data integrity are assured, we also need to 
ensure the freshness of each message. Informally, data freshness suggests that the data is 
recent, and it ensures that no old messages have been replayed. This requirement is 
especially important when there are shared-key strategies employed in the design. Typically 
shared keys need to be changed over time. Another important issue is the availability factor 
of the nodes or the transmission media. The network should remain operational all the time. 
It must have some redundancy to counter link failures and have the capability to survive 
against different attacks. 
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The ad hoc or infrastructure less feature brings a great challenge to WSN security as well. 
For example, the dynamics of the whole network inhibits the idea of pre-distribution of a 
shared key between the base station and all sensors. Several random key pre-distribution 
schemes have been proposed in the context of symmetric encryption techniques (Chan, et al. 
(2003), Liu, et al. (2005)). In the context of applying public-key cryptography techniques in 
sensor networks, an efficient mechanism for public-key distribution is necessary as well. In 
the same way that distributed sensor networks must self-organize to support multi-hop 
routing, they must also self-organize to conduct key management and building trust relation 
among sensors. If self-organization is lacking in a sensor network, the damage resulting 
from an attack or even the hazardous environment may be devastating. Since WSN is a 
wireless service-oriented infrastructure, one of the most problematic attacks that it may face 
is the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. A DoS attack on WSN may take several forms: node 
collaboration, in which a set of nodes act maliciously and prevent broadcast messages from 
reaching certain section(s) of the sensor network; jamming attack, in which an attacker jams 
the communication channel and avoids any member of the network in the affected area to 
send or receive any packet; and exhaustion of power, in which an attacker repeatedly 
requests packets from sensors to deplete their battery life. Newsome et al. describe the Sybil 
attack as it relates to wireless sensor networks (Newson, et al. 2004). Simply put, the Sybil 
attack is defined as a “malicious device illegitimately taking on multiple identities” 
(Newson, et al. (2004)). It was originally described as an attack able to defeat the 
redundancy mechanisms of distributed data storage systems in peer-to-peer networks. In a 
nutshell, the security vulnerability of a WSN can be listed as: 
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
• Link layer attacks 
• Network layer attacks 
• Transport layer attacks 
• Link and physical layer attacks 
Apart from security concern, privacy preservation in WSN is a big challenge. The explosive 
growth and advancement of the information age, data collection and data analysis have 
exploded both in size and complexity. This in turn has impacted on the privacy preservation 
of the data of individual users or the network itself. Privacy in our context can be defined as 
the control over access to information about oneself. Privacy is also the limited access to a 
person or a process and to all the features related to the person. Privacy preservation is 
important from both individual as well as organizational perspectives. There are three types 
of privacy threats. If an adversary can determine the meaning of a communication exchange 
because of the existence of a message and the context of the situation, there is a content 
privacy threat. If an adversary is able to deduce the identities of the nodes involved in a 
communication, there is an identity privacy threat. And if the adversary is able to infer the 
physical location of a communication entity or to approximate the relative distance to that 
entity, there is a location privacy threat.  
In this book chapter, more emphasis will be given to privacy issues. It is understood that 
good amount of research works are directed (Karlof, et al. (2003), Law, et al. (2006), Gaubatz, 
et al. (2005) towards solving the problems of WSN security, whereas lesser effort have been 
put towards mitigating the problems related to WSN privacy. In fact, with the advent of the 
concept ubiquitous computing (Weiser, et al. (1991)), privacy becomes as important as 
security. So, we mainly focus on WSN privacy issues and highlight the WSN security in 
brief considering the large volume of work has been already done. 
 
2. WSN Security 
WSNs provide unique opportunities of interaction between computing devices and their 
environment. The adhoc nature and wireless vulnerability make WSN a soft target for 
security attacks. In order to understand the security aspects of WSN, we provide a brief 
description of the different attacks and then present the possible solutions. First, we find out 
the requirements of WSN security. Then we present some of the typical attacks on WSN 
security and lastly we describe some well-known mechanisms for preventing some the 
attacks.  
 
2.1 WSN requirements 
WSN can be considered as a highly distributed database with wireless links. Security goals 
for distributed databases are very well studied. The data should be accessible only to 
authorized users (confidentiality), the data should be genuine (integrity), and the data 
should be always available on the request of an authorized user (availability). All these 
requirements also apply to WSNs and their users. Data confidentiality is the most important 
issue in network security. The objective of confidentiality is required in sensors environment 
to protect information travelling among the sensor nodes of the network or between the 
sensors and the base station from disclosure. With the implementation of confidentiality, an 
adversary may be unable to steal information. However, this doesn’t mean the data is safe. 
The adversary can change the data, so as to send the sensor network into disarray. For 
example, a malicious node may add some fragments or manipulate the data within a packet. 
This new packet can then be sent to the original receiver. Data loss or damage can even 
occur without the presence of a malicious node due to the harsh communication 
environment. Thus, data integrity ensures that any received data has not been altered in 
transit. Authentication in sensor networks is essential for each sensor node and base station 
to have the ability to verify that the data received was really sent by a trusted sender or not. 
This authentication is needed during the clustering of sensor node in WSN. We can trust the 
data sent by the nodes in that group after clustering. Integrity controls must be implemented 
to ensure that information will not be altered in any unexpected way. Many sensor 
applications such as pollution and healthcare monitoring rely on the integrity of the 
information to function with accurate outcomes. Secure management is needed at base 
station, clustered nodes, and protocol layer in WSN. Because security issues like key 
distribution to sensor nodes in order to establish encryption and routing information need 
secure management. Even if confidentiality and data integrity are assured, we also need to 
ensure the freshness of each message. Informally, data freshness suggests that the data is 
recent, and it ensures that no old messages have been replayed. This requirement is 
especially important when there are shared-key strategies employed in the design. Typically 
shared keys need to be changed over time. Another important issue is the availability factor 
of the nodes or the transmission media. The network should remain operational all the time. 
It must have some redundancy to counter link failures and have the capability to survive 
against different attacks. 
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It also needs to be understood that these requirements are to be satisfied under some kinds 
of limitations. Among them, limitation of device resources (limited energy, memory and 
computation power), unreliable communication (packet drop, latency, transmission 
conflicts) and unattended operation (no centralized control) need to be taken care of. 
 
2.2 WSN attacks 
WSNs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. These attacks can be broadly categorized as 
passive and active. Passive attacks do not disrupt the operation of the network. In this case 
the attacker snoops the data exchanged inside the network without modifying it. Detection 
of passive attacks is very difficult since the operation does not get affected. Where as in 
active attacks, data is altered and thus disturbing the normal network activities. In this 
chapter, we mostly focus on active attacks. It can be noted that attacks on WSNs are not 
limited to simply denial of service attacks, but rather encompass a variety of techniques 
including node takeovers, attacks on the routing protocols, and attacks on a node’s physical 
security. We present the typical attacks from the perspective of protocol layers from where 
they are initiated. 
 
2.2.1 Physical layer attack 
Physical layer is responsible transmission of raw data bits. This is mostly involved in 
modulation, coding, signal detection and data encryption. Broadly two types of attacks are 
possible. Jamming attack is responsible for disturbing and disrupting the transmission 
between sender and receiver (Shi, et al. (2004)). In device tempering attack, the sensor device 
is physically tempered by the attacker to extract or alter the cryptographic keys and other 
important information (Wang, et al. (2005), Wang, et al. (2004)). 
 
2.2.2 Link layer attack 
In link layer, artificial collision creation, resource exhaustion, unfair and unbalanced 
resource allocation kind of attacks take place (Akyildiz, et al. (2002). In fact, unfairness is a 
kind of weak DoS attack (Wood (2002). In this scenario, the attacker attempts to degrade the 
time-critical applications of other nodes by disrupting their frame transmission. Another 
link-layer threat to WSNs is the denial-of-sleep attack. This attach prevents the node from 
going into sleep mode (Raymond (2006)). 
 
2.2.3 Network layer attack 
Network layer of WSN is vulnerable to various attacks. In wormhole attack, the attacker 
receives packets at one location in the network and tunnels them to another location inside 
the network, where the packet is resent into the network (Hu, et al. (2003)). The tunnel 
between the colluding attacker nodes is referred as wormhole. A particularly harmful attack 
against sensor networks is known as the Sybil attack, where a node illegitimately claims 
multiple identities. Newsome et al. describe the Sybil attack as it relates to WSNs. Sybil 
attack is defined as a “malicious device illegitimately taking on multiple identities” 
(Douceur, et al. (2002)). It was originally described as an attack able to defeat the 
redundancy mechanisms of distributed data storage systems in peer-to-peer networks. 
Another well-known attack which produces great amount of harm is traffic-analysis attack. 
For example, a rate monitoring attack simply makes use of the idea that nodes closest to the 
base station tend to forward more packets than those farther away from the base station. An 
attacker need only monitor which nodes are sending packets and follow those nodes that 
are sending the most packets. In a time correlation attack, an adversary simply generates 
events and monitors to whom a node sends its packets (Deng, et al.  (2004)). Attacks where 
adversaries have full control of a number of authenticated devices and behave arbitrarily to 
disrupt the network are referred to as Byzantine attacks. The goal of a Byzantine node is to 
disrupt the communication of other nodes in the network, without regard to its own 
resource consumption (Awerbuch, et al.  (2004)). So, it is very hard to detect. In fact, a basic 
Byzantine attack is a black hole attack where the adversary stops forwarding data packets, 
but still participates in the routing protocol correctly. Routing attack is launched at 
disrupting the data transmission of the network. In routing attacks, routing table overflow, 
routing table poisoning, packet replication, rushing attacks (Hu, et al. (2003)) are reported.  
The most general attacks to WSN routing are spoofing, replaying, or altering routing-control 
information. In these attacks the adversary injects bogus routing information into the 
network. This leads to routing inconsistencies, and, as a consequence increases end-to-end 
delays and packet loss in the network. Fortunately, these types of attacks can be effectively 
prevented using link-layer authentication and anti-replay techniques. In a sinkhole attack, 
an attacker makes a compromised node look more attractive to its neighbors by forging the 
routing information. 
 
2.2.4 Transport layer attack 
At the Transport Layer attacks target the protocols that provide transfer of data between 
end systems. When explicit connections between identifiable nodes are used, either end of 
the connection maintains some form of connection control block. An attacker can issue a 
large number of connection setup requests that result in the exhaustion of memory at the 
end nodes. This is called a TCP SYN flood attack. Flooding and de-synchronization attacks 
are specific to transport layer. Flooding can be as simple as sending many connection 
requests to a susceptible node. In this case, resources must be allocated to handle the 
connection request. Eventually a node’s resources will be exhausted, thus rendering the 
node useless. Another vulnerability is by session hijacking attack, where the adversary takes 
control over a session between two nodes. The adversary node masquerades as one of the 
end nodes of the session and hijacks the session. Another kind of Transport Layer attack is 
the desynchronization attack. This attack targets the transport protocols that rely on 
sequence numbers. An attacker issues forged packets with wrong sequence numbers and, as 
a result, causes retransmissions, which waste both energy and bandwidth. 
 
2.2.5 Multilayer attack 
Multilayer attacks are those that could occur in any layer of the network protocol stack. In a 
denial-of-service (DoS) attack, an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users from 
accessing information or services (Wood, et al. (2002)). DoS attacks are commonly launched 
from one or more points on the Internet that are external to the victim’s own system or 
network. In many cases, the launch point consists of one or more systems that have been 
subverted by an intruder via a security-related compromise rather than from the intruder’s 
own system or systems. DoS attacks on the Internet may be launched by botnets and carried 
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It also needs to be understood that these requirements are to be satisfied under some kinds 
of limitations. Among them, limitation of device resources (limited energy, memory and 
computation power), unreliable communication (packet drop, latency, transmission 
conflicts) and unattended operation (no centralized control) need to be taken care of. 
 
2.2 WSN attacks 
WSNs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. These attacks can be broadly categorized as 
passive and active. Passive attacks do not disrupt the operation of the network. In this case 
the attacker snoops the data exchanged inside the network without modifying it. Detection 
of passive attacks is very difficult since the operation does not get affected. Where as in 
active attacks, data is altered and thus disturbing the normal network activities. In this 
chapter, we mostly focus on active attacks. It can be noted that attacks on WSNs are not 
limited to simply denial of service attacks, but rather encompass a variety of techniques 
including node takeovers, attacks on the routing protocols, and attacks on a node’s physical 
security. We present the typical attacks from the perspective of protocol layers from where 
they are initiated. 
 
2.2.1 Physical layer attack 
Physical layer is responsible transmission of raw data bits. This is mostly involved in 
modulation, coding, signal detection and data encryption. Broadly two types of attacks are 
possible. Jamming attack is responsible for disturbing and disrupting the transmission 
between sender and receiver (Shi, et al. (2004)). In device tempering attack, the sensor device 
is physically tempered by the attacker to extract or alter the cryptographic keys and other 
important information (Wang, et al. (2005), Wang, et al. (2004)). 
 
2.2.2 Link layer attack 
In link layer, artificial collision creation, resource exhaustion, unfair and unbalanced 
resource allocation kind of attacks take place (Akyildiz, et al. (2002). In fact, unfairness is a 
kind of weak DoS attack (Wood (2002). In this scenario, the attacker attempts to degrade the 
time-critical applications of other nodes by disrupting their frame transmission. Another 
link-layer threat to WSNs is the denial-of-sleep attack. This attach prevents the node from 
going into sleep mode (Raymond (2006)). 
 
2.2.3 Network layer attack 
Network layer of WSN is vulnerable to various attacks. In wormhole attack, the attacker 
receives packets at one location in the network and tunnels them to another location inside 
the network, where the packet is resent into the network (Hu, et al. (2003)). The tunnel 
between the colluding attacker nodes is referred as wormhole. A particularly harmful attack 
against sensor networks is known as the Sybil attack, where a node illegitimately claims 
multiple identities. Newsome et al. describe the Sybil attack as it relates to WSNs. Sybil 
attack is defined as a “malicious device illegitimately taking on multiple identities” 
(Douceur, et al. (2002)). It was originally described as an attack able to defeat the 
redundancy mechanisms of distributed data storage systems in peer-to-peer networks. 
Another well-known attack which produces great amount of harm is traffic-analysis attack. 
For example, a rate monitoring attack simply makes use of the idea that nodes closest to the 
base station tend to forward more packets than those farther away from the base station. An 
attacker need only monitor which nodes are sending packets and follow those nodes that 
are sending the most packets. In a time correlation attack, an adversary simply generates 
events and monitors to whom a node sends its packets (Deng, et al.  (2004)). Attacks where 
adversaries have full control of a number of authenticated devices and behave arbitrarily to 
disrupt the network are referred to as Byzantine attacks. The goal of a Byzantine node is to 
disrupt the communication of other nodes in the network, without regard to its own 
resource consumption (Awerbuch, et al.  (2004)). So, it is very hard to detect. In fact, a basic 
Byzantine attack is a black hole attack where the adversary stops forwarding data packets, 
but still participates in the routing protocol correctly. Routing attack is launched at 
disrupting the data transmission of the network. In routing attacks, routing table overflow, 
routing table poisoning, packet replication, rushing attacks (Hu, et al. (2003)) are reported.  
The most general attacks to WSN routing are spoofing, replaying, or altering routing-control 
information. In these attacks the adversary injects bogus routing information into the 
network. This leads to routing inconsistencies, and, as a consequence increases end-to-end 
delays and packet loss in the network. Fortunately, these types of attacks can be effectively 
prevented using link-layer authentication and anti-replay techniques. In a sinkhole attack, 
an attacker makes a compromised node look more attractive to its neighbors by forging the 
routing information. 
 
2.2.4 Transport layer attack 
At the Transport Layer attacks target the protocols that provide transfer of data between 
end systems. When explicit connections between identifiable nodes are used, either end of 
the connection maintains some form of connection control block. An attacker can issue a 
large number of connection setup requests that result in the exhaustion of memory at the 
end nodes. This is called a TCP SYN flood attack. Flooding and de-synchronization attacks 
are specific to transport layer. Flooding can be as simple as sending many connection 
requests to a susceptible node. In this case, resources must be allocated to handle the 
connection request. Eventually a node’s resources will be exhausted, thus rendering the 
node useless. Another vulnerability is by session hijacking attack, where the adversary takes 
control over a session between two nodes. The adversary node masquerades as one of the 
end nodes of the session and hijacks the session. Another kind of Transport Layer attack is 
the desynchronization attack. This attack targets the transport protocols that rely on 
sequence numbers. An attacker issues forged packets with wrong sequence numbers and, as 
a result, causes retransmissions, which waste both energy and bandwidth. 
 
2.2.5 Multilayer attack 
Multilayer attacks are those that could occur in any layer of the network protocol stack. In a 
denial-of-service (DoS) attack, an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users from 
accessing information or services (Wood, et al. (2002)). DoS attacks are commonly launched 
from one or more points on the Internet that are external to the victim’s own system or 
network. In many cases, the launch point consists of one or more systems that have been 
subverted by an intruder via a security-related compromise rather than from the intruder’s 
own system or systems. DoS attacks on the Internet may be launched by botnets and carried 
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out by compromised machines running zombie processes in the background unbeknownst 
to the owner of the machine, thus the risk for physical identification and apprehension of 
the attacker is reduced. 
 
2.3 WSN security mechanisms 
In this section, we briefly describe the different important security mechanisms to prevent 
some of the above mentioned attacks. Good amount of research efforts are engaged in 
finding solutions to nullify the adversary’s intention. WSN security mechanisms mainly 
consist of robust cryptographic techniques, efficient key management, certification and 
other advanced methods. It is indispensable to provide basic security primitives to the 
sensor nodes in order to give a minimal protection to the information flow and a foundation 
to create secure protocols. Those security primitives are Symmetric Key Cryptography 
(SKC), hash primitives, and Public Key Cryptography (PKC). Since sensor nodes are highly 
constrained in terms of resources, implementing the security primitives in an efficient way 
(using less energy, computational time and memory space) without sacrificing the strength 
of their security properties is one of the major challenges in this area, a challenge that most 
of the state-of-the-art have managed to achieve. SKC primitives use the same secret key for 
both encryption and decryption. Instances of these primitives are able to provide 
confidentiality to a certain information flow, given that the origin and the destination of the 
data share the same secret key. They can also provide integrity and authentication if a 
certain mode of operation is used. These algorithms are usually not very complex, and they 
can be implemented easily in resource-constrained devices. Symmetric cryptography is 
therefore the typical choice for applications that cannot afford the computational complexity 
of asymmetric cryptography. Symmetric schemes utilize a single shared key known only 
between the two communicating hosts. This shared key is used for both encrypting and 
decrypting data. The traditional example of symmetric cryptography is DES (Data 
Encryption Standard). The use of DES, however, is quite limited due to the fact that it can be 
broken relatively easily. In light of the shortcomings of DES, other symmetric cryptography 
systems have been proposed including 3DES (Triple DES), RC5, AES, and so on (Schneier, 
(1996)). It can be noted that PKC is better solution where key management is an issue. In the 
case, where the sensor nodes can manage some amount of computational resources to 
perform PKC, it is always advisable to apply PKC. SKC suffers from key management 
problem. PKC, also known as asymmetric cryptography, is a form of cryptography that uses 
two keys: a key called private key, which has to be kept private, and another key named 
public key, which is publicly known. Any operation done with the private key can only be 
reversed with the public key, and vice versa. This nice property makes all PKC-based 
algorithms useful for authentication purposes. Still, the computational cost of calculating 
their underlying operations had hindered its application in highly-constrained devices, such 
as sensor nodes. One of the most promising PKC primitives in the field of WSN security is 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), due to the small size of the keys, the memory and 
energy savings, and the simplicity of its underlying operation, the scalar point 
multiplication (Kobiltz. (1987), Liu, et al. (2005)). In order to securely distribute the 
cryptographic keys among the sensor nodes, efficient key management scheme needs to be 
deployed. Broadly, WSN key management has two categories: deterministic and 
probabilistic. In functional terms, three keying models are used tto cater for WSN Security 
and operational requirements: Network Keying, Pairwise Keying, and Group Keying. 
Network keying has the advantage of being simple, flexible, and scalable. It allows data 
aggregation and fusion and it is able to self-organize (a key requirement in WSN). But it 
lacks robustness. Pairwise keying provides authentication for each node and it is by far the 
most robust in nature, which in turn makes it non-scalable, non-flexible and unable to self-
organize. Group keying on the other hand is more robust than network keying. It allows 
group collaboration and multi-cast. It is able to self-organize with in cluster, but cluster 
formation information is application dependent. It also lacks efficient storage for group 
keying in IEEE 802.15.4. One of the promising WSN key distribution mechanisms is due to 
Eschenauer and Gligor (Eschenauer, L. & Gligor, V.D, 2002)). This protocol is simple, 
elegant and provides effective tradeoff between robustness and scalability. In this scheme a 
large pool of keys are generated (eg: 10,000 keys). Randomly take ‘K’ keys out of the pool to 
establish a key ring (K << N). Path key discovery is made When two nodes communicate 
they search for a common key within the key ring by broadcasting their identities (ID’s) of 
the keys they have. Let M be the number of distinct cryptographic keys that can be stored on 
a client node. At the pre-deployment phase, a random pool of keys K out of the total 
possible key space is chosen. For each node, M keys are randomly selected from the key 
pool K and stored into the node’s memory. This set of M keys is called the node’s key ring. 
The number of keys in the key pool, |K|, is chosen such that two random subsets of size M 
in K shares at least one key with some probability p. After the client nodes are deployed, a 
key-setup phase is performed. The nodes first perform key-discovery to find out with which 
of their neighbors they should share a key. This key discovery is securely performed by 
Merkle puzzle policy (Merkle. (1978)), where each client node issues M client puzzles (one 
for each of the M keys) to each neighboring node. Any node that responds with the correct 
answer to the client puzzle is thus identified as a trusted client, who knows the associated 
key. Client nodes which discover that they contain a shared key in their key rings then 
verify that their neighbor actually holds the key through a challenge-response protocol. The 
shared key then becomes the key for that link. After key-setup is complete, a connected 
graph of secure links is formed. 
 
One needs to find the right parameters such that the graph generated during the key-setup 
phase is connected. Consider a random graph G (n, pc) a graph of n clients for which the 
probability that a link exists between any two nodes is pc. Erdos and Renyi showed that for 
monotone properties of a graph G (n, pc) there exists a value of pc over which the property 
exhibits a “phase transition”, i.e., it abruptly transitions from “likely false” to “likely true”. 
So, it is possible to calculate some expected degree d for the vertices in the graph such that 
the graph is connected with some high probability c. Eschenauer and Gligor calculated the 
necessary expected node degree d in terms of the size of the network n as: 
 � �  �� � �� � �l���� � l��� l������  
From the formula, d (degree of the client node) = O(log n). It can be observed that the key 
distribution we presented is a generalized one and it can be deployed in multi-hop network. 
The scheme is scalable and it requires less than N-1 keys to be stored. But it lacks 
authentication process and does not clearly define any process for revoking or refreshing 
keys. The dynamic handshaking process prevents any form of data aggregation (eg: one 
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out by compromised machines running zombie processes in the background unbeknownst 
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event detected by two neighboring nodes will result in two separate signals.). it provides no 
support for collaborative operations and no node is guaranteed to have common key with 
all of its neighbors, there is a chance that some nodes are unreachable. It also fails to satisfy 
security requirement authentication and operational requirement accessibility. LEAP is 
another important key management scheme which needs mentioning. LEAP (Zhu, et al. 
(2003)) uses four types of keys: Individual, group, cluster and pairwise shared keys. The 
authentication mechanism known as µ-TESLA is used for the broadcast authentication of 
the sink node, which ensures that the packets sent with the group are from the sink node 
only. It also employs one-way hash-key mechanism for source packet authentication. LEAP 
uses a pre-distribution key to help establish the four types of keys. The individual key is first 
established using a function of a seed and the ID of the node. Then nodes broadcast their 
IDs. The receiving node uses a function, seeded with an initial key, to calculate the shared 
key between it and all of its neighbors. Thirdly, the cluster key is distributed by the cluster 
head using pairwise communication secured with the pairwise shared key. Lastly for 
distributing the network-wide group key, the sink node broadcasts it in a multihop cluster- 
by-cluster manner starting with the closest cluster.  It has µ-TESLA and one-way key chain 
authentication as well as key revocation and key refreshing. The scheme is scalable and able 
to perform cluster communications. But it works on the assumption that the sink node is 
never compromised. 
Another threat needs to be considred is physical tempering. It can be noted the sensor nodes 
are embdedded platform, so we have to provide platform security, which is temper proof. 
Recently, good amount of development has taken place in embedded platform security. 
Among the commercial relaeses, Trusted Platform Module by Atmel and Trustzone by ARM  
are worth mentioning. Trusted platform module (TPM) is to provide the minimal hardware 
needs to build a trusted platform in software. While usually implemented as a secure 
coprocessor, the functionality of a TPM is limited enough to allow for a relatively cheap 
implementation – at the price that the TPM itself does not solve any security problem, but 
rather offers a foundation to build upon. Thus, such a module can be added to an existing 
architecture rather cheaply, providing the lowest layer for larger security architecture. The 
main driver behind this approach is the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), a large 
consortium of the main players in the IT industry, and the successor to the Trusted 
Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA). TrustZone consists of a hardware-enforced security 
environment providing code isolation, together with secure software that provides both the 
fundamental security services and interfaces to other elements in the trusted chain, 
including smartcards, operating systems and general applications. TrustZone separates two 
parallel execution worlds: the non-secure ‘normal’ execution environment, and a trusted, 
certifiable secure world. TrustZone offers a number of key technical and commercial 
benefits to developers and end-users. TrustZone software components are a result of a 
successful collaboration with software security experts, Trusted Logic, and provide a secure 
execution environment and basic security services such as cryptography, safe storage and 
integrity checking to help ensure device and platform security. By enabling security at the 
device level, TrustZone provides a platform for addressing security issues at the application 
and user levels. Below (fig. 1 & 2) we show the hardware and software architecture of ARM 
trustzone for reader’s better understanding of a secure computing environment. 
 Fig. 1. Trustzone hardware architecture 
 
 Fig. 2. Trustzone software architecture 
 
2.4 WSN trust and reputation management 
Another important aspect of WSN security is trust and reputation management. Secure trust 
management policy has the responsibility that network activity can continue as securely as 
possible without affecting the benign entities. It has the additional duty of isolating 
malicious agents and also to warn benign entities. Good amount of research effort has been 
made to find practical and reliable trust management models (Josang, et al. (2007), Xiong, et 
al. (2004)). In fact, trust management which is introduced in (Blaze, et al. (1996)) defined it as 
“a unified approach to specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and 
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to perform cluster communications. But it works on the assumption that the sink node is 
never compromised. 
Another threat needs to be considred is physical tempering. It can be noted the sensor nodes 
are embdedded platform, so we have to provide platform security, which is temper proof. 
Recently, good amount of development has taken place in embedded platform security. 
Among the commercial relaeses, Trusted Platform Module by Atmel and Trustzone by ARM  
are worth mentioning. Trusted platform module (TPM) is to provide the minimal hardware 
needs to build a trusted platform in software. While usually implemented as a secure 
coprocessor, the functionality of a TPM is limited enough to allow for a relatively cheap 
implementation – at the price that the TPM itself does not solve any security problem, but 
rather offers a foundation to build upon. Thus, such a module can be added to an existing 
architecture rather cheaply, providing the lowest layer for larger security architecture. The 
main driver behind this approach is the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), a large 
consortium of the main players in the IT industry, and the successor to the Trusted 
Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA). TrustZone consists of a hardware-enforced security 
environment providing code isolation, together with secure software that provides both the 
fundamental security services and interfaces to other elements in the trusted chain, 
including smartcards, operating systems and general applications. TrustZone separates two 
parallel execution worlds: the non-secure ‘normal’ execution environment, and a trusted, 
certifiable secure world. TrustZone offers a number of key technical and commercial 
benefits to developers and end-users. TrustZone software components are a result of a 
successful collaboration with software security experts, Trusted Logic, and provide a secure 
execution environment and basic security services such as cryptography, safe storage and 
integrity checking to help ensure device and platform security. By enabling security at the 
device level, TrustZone provides a platform for addressing security issues at the application 
and user levels. Below (fig. 1 & 2) we show the hardware and software architecture of ARM 
trustzone for reader’s better understanding of a secure computing environment. 
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2.4 WSN trust and reputation management 
Another important aspect of WSN security is trust and reputation management. Secure trust 
management policy has the responsibility that network activity can continue as securely as 
possible without affecting the benign entities. It has the additional duty of isolating 
malicious agents and also to warn benign entities. Good amount of research effort has been 
made to find practical and reliable trust management models (Josang, et al. (2007), Xiong, et 
al. (2004)). In fact, trust management which is introduced in (Blaze, et al. (1996)) defined it as 
“a unified approach to specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and 
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relationships which allow direct authorization of security-critical actions”. In (Grandison, et 
al. (2002)), trust management is defined in a broader sense as: “Trust management is the 
activity of collecting, encoding, analyzing and presenting evidence relating to competence, 
honesty, security or dependability with the purpose of making assessments and decisions 
regarding trust relationships”. Traditionally trust management is studied under 
decentralized control environment (Li., et al. (2003). The authors described different aspects 
of the trust management problem. They have formulated security policies and security 
credentials, determined whether particular sets of credentials satisfy the relevant policies, 
and how deferring trust to third parties could provide better stability of the networks. 
Rahman and Hailes  (Rahman, et al. (1997)) presented a distributed recommendation-based 
trust model, where conditional transitivity of trust concept is proposed. They have 
quantified trust as a multi-value concept. 
Apart from research community, business houses and commercial organizations use and 
practice trust management modeling very frequently. Ebay uses reputation based trust 
management. It has the simple trust rating system for its users. For each successful 
transaction, sellers and buyers are invited to rate each other on the scale of 1. +1 is positive, 
0 for neutral, -1 for negative response. Last six months ratings are taking in account by eBay 
to calculate a reputation of a user. 
There are mainly two approaches for developing trust management system: policy based 
and reputation based. Policy based mechanisms employ different policy and engines for 
specifying and reasoning on rules for trust establishment (Stab, et al. (2004)). These 
mechanisms mostly rely on access control. Trust management based on distribution of 
certificates is presented in (Davis. (2004)) where trust is re-established by carrying out 
weighted analysis of the accusations received from different entities. On the other hand, 
reputation-based approaches have been proposed for managing trust in public key 
certificates, in P2P systems, mobile ad-hoc networks and in the Semantic Web. Reputation-
based trust is used in distributed systems where a system only has a limited view of the 
information in the whole networks. It can be observed that reputation based trust 
management system is dynamic in nature (Duma, et al. al. (2005)) and new trust relationship 
is established frequently based on the malicious activities in the network. The main issues 
characterizing the reputation based trust management systems are the trust metric 
generation and the management of reputation data. In (Boukerch, et al. (2007)), agent-based 
trust and reputation management scheme (ATRM) for WSNs is presented. From this 
background we develop our reputation based trust modeling. In this model the nodes with 
collaboration from others form an honest opinion about each other. This model has two 
layers. In first layer trust model is formed against the selfish behavior of a node. This means 
that nodes with selfish behavior pattern will be identified, punished and if required isolated 
from performing any operations. The other layer is the trust modeling against malicious 
nodes, which falsely accuse other nodes as untrustworthy in order to disrupt the normal 
network activity. 
In order to illustrate this, we refer to fig. 3. In this architecture, there are N number of sensor 
nodes and they communicate wirelessly. The sensor nodes through multi-hop routing send 
the sensed data to other nodes in another network or to internet through a cluster head or 
gateway. In order to properly maintain the self-configuring nature of the network, the nodes 
need to collaborate. Every node when needs to communicate to the gateway has to route the 
data in multi-hop. For this, it needs to take help of its neighborhood nodes. Let us consider 
the case depicted in fig. 3. Node A needs to send a data to the gateway. Its neighbor consists 
of the nodes B, C and F. The shortest path for A to reach the gateway is through C and then 
C-D. But it may turn out that the shortest path is not the trusted path. Node a sends the data 
to C, but C maliciously drop it or send it to node I, which is another malicious node. So, for 
A to effectively send the data to gateway it has to first find the trustworthiness of the 
neighborhood nodes.  If A finds B is a trusted node, it sends the data to B for forwarding 
ignoring C. If A discovers F is more trusted than B, A sends the data to F.  The objective is to 
send the data through the most trusted node even that does not guarantee in shortest path, 
but this ensures reliability. We can observe that in mission critical or defense application 
data security and reliable transmission is often much more required than mere energy 
efficiency. In this case, node A needs to find out the trustworthiness of its neighborhood to 
update its data. Neighborhood of node A consists of node B, node C and node F. We define 
few terms as below: ������� � � ����� ����� ��� �� ����ܨ  ������ � ���������� ����� �� � �� ��ܨ  ������ � ���������� ����� �� � ��  ��ܨ ������ � ���������� ����� �� ܨ �� ��� ���� � �݃� �� ���������� ����� �� � �� � ���� � �݃� �� ���������� ����� �� � �� � ���� � �݃� �� ���������� ����� �� � �� ܨ  
 Fig. 3. Trusted node identification in WSN 
 
In the network, individual nodes broadcast the computed reputation value of its entire 
neighborhood. When a particular node receives such a notification, it stores the values 
related to its neighbor nodes only and ignores the values of other nodes. For node A, it only 
accepts the reputation values of node B, C and F, i.e node A considers the reputation values  ��� � ��� � � � � �� , ��� � ��� � � � � �� . and  ��� � ��� � � � � ��  for nodes B,C and F. 
Accordingly, node A finds the reputation values of other nodes C and F. It can be noted that 
this reputation value cannot be taken as the sole source of trustworthiness of a node. There 
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transaction, sellers and buyers are invited to rate each other on the scale of 1. +1 is positive, 
0 for neutral, -1 for negative response. Last six months ratings are taking in account by eBay 
to calculate a reputation of a user. 
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specifying and reasoning on rules for trust establishment (Stab, et al. (2004)). These 
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background we develop our reputation based trust modeling. In this model the nodes with 
collaboration from others form an honest opinion about each other. This model has two 
layers. In first layer trust model is formed against the selfish behavior of a node. This means 
that nodes with selfish behavior pattern will be identified, punished and if required isolated 
from performing any operations. The other layer is the trust modeling against malicious 
nodes, which falsely accuse other nodes as untrustworthy in order to disrupt the normal 
network activity. 
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nodes and they communicate wirelessly. The sensor nodes through multi-hop routing send 
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send the data through the most trusted node even that does not guarantee in shortest path, 
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In the network, individual nodes broadcast the computed reputation value of its entire 
neighborhood. When a particular node receives such a notification, it stores the values 
related to its neighbor nodes only and ignores the values of other nodes. For node A, it only 
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Accordingly, node A finds the reputation values of other nodes C and F. It can be noted that 
this reputation value cannot be taken as the sole source of trustworthiness of a node. There 
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are other factors like the age of the reported reputation value and the previous trust value of 
those nodes which are to be considered to compute the overall trust factor of the node. 
Taking this into account, reputation value of B by C is: ����� �  ���� � ����  �  ����  
where, ����� � ���� �������� ���������� ����� �� � �� � 
After computing the reputation value of node B, node A computes the trust value of node b 
as: ���� �  ∑ ������ ��� � � � � � ��∑ �����  �  ������ ��� � � � � � ��  
Same way node A computes the trust value of node C and F (its neighborhood nodes). It 
should be remembered that even if node A does not require sending data, it is always 
required to compute the trust values of its neighborhood. Otherwise the computed trust 
value does not reflect the trust history of a node, which may lead to wrong judgment. Based 
on the latest computed trust values of its neighborhood, node A decides to send the packet 
through one of its neighbor nodes.  Fi�� M�x �T��A�� where � � �� �� F 
This is to find out the most trustworthy neighbor 
Let,   TA �  M�x �T��A�� where � � �� �� F 
Where, TA is the most trustworthy �o�e Fi�� Mi� �S��A�� where � � �� �� F 
Where , S��A is the distance between node A to other neighborhood nodes. This is to find 
out the shortest possible path.  
Let,  SA �  Mi� �S��A�� where � � �� �� F 
Where, SA is the most tshortest p�th �o�e 
Based on the trust values and shortest path parameters available to node A, it decides on the 
route to send data as per the rule below: 
1. If,  �� �  ��, select that node to send data from A 2. Else if, ���� �  ����, select that node where ���� is the node with next shortest path. 
where ���� is the node with next best trustworthiness. 
3. Else select ��, irrespective of ��  
Now if we consider the generalized case of N number of neighbors for node A, the selection 
procedure continues upto N/2, i.e. trust value from 1 upto N/2th will be compared with 
that of the node with shortest path. Whichever is found the earliest, is selected, else the most 
trusted node is selected. In other words,  
If,  �� �  ��, select that node to send data from A Elseif, A = A-1, upto  A= A-N/2-1 
Else, select ��  
The above stated algorithm enforces reliability of data transfer by selecting the trusted node, 
even if it is required to send the data through not the shortest path. This algorithm enhances 
reliability to a larger extent with some extra communication cost by sending data through a 
non-shortest route. This is very much required for reliable transmission and to adapt to 
noncooperation in a collaborative computing environment. Our algorithm finds an 
optimized path between reliability and efficiency. Though at the end, reliability is given 
preference (when no matching of trusted node and shortest path is found) over efficiency. 
 
3. WSN Privacy 
Privacy preservation is an important issue in today’s context of extreme penetration of 
Internet and mobile technologies. It is more important in the case of WSNs where collected 
data often requires in-network processing and collaborative computing. Researches in this 
area are mostly concentrated in applying data mining techniques to preserve the privacy 
content of the data. These techniques are mostly computationally expensive and not suitable 
for resource limited WSN nodes.  
 
With ubiquitous connectivity, people are increasingly using electronic technologies in 
business-to-consumer and business-to-business settings. This in effect helps a third party to 
acquire the confidential and private information from various avenues. Depending upon the 
nature of the information, users may not be willing to divulge the individual values of 
records. This has lead to concerns that the private data may be misused for a variety of 
purposes. Privacy can be defined as the limited access to a person or a process and to all the 
features related to the person or the process. Privacy preservation is important from both 
individual as well as organizational perspectives. For example, customers might send to a 
remote database queries that contain private information. Two competing commercial 
organizations might jointly invest in a project that must satisfy both organizations' private 
and valuable constraints, and so on. In order to alleviate these concerns, a number of 
techniques have recently been proposed to perform the data mining tasks in a privacy-
preserving way, which is called Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM). The research of 
PPDM is aimed at bridging the gap between collaborative data mining and data privacy. 
Privacy-preserving data mining finds numerous applications in surveillance, in-network 
processing, which are naturally supposed to be “privacy-violating” applications. The key is 
to design methods (Sweeney, (2005)), which are effective without compromising on security. 
In the literature, number of techniques has been illustrated to effectively preserve the 
privacy of the source data. One of most popular method is randomization. The 
randomization method is a technique in which noise is added to the data to be privacy-
protected. This is done to mask the attribute values of records (Agrawal, et al. (2000). The 
noise added to the data is sufficiently large so that individual values cannot be recovered. 
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procedure continues upto N/2, i.e. trust value from 1 upto N/2th will be compared with 
that of the node with shortest path. Whichever is found the earliest, is selected, else the most 
trusted node is selected. In other words,  
If,  �� �  ��, select that node to send data from A Elseif, A = A-1, upto  A= A-N/2-1 
Else, select ��  
The above stated algorithm enforces reliability of data transfer by selecting the trusted node, 
even if it is required to send the data through not the shortest path. This algorithm enhances 
reliability to a larger extent with some extra communication cost by sending data through a 
non-shortest route. This is very much required for reliable transmission and to adapt to 
noncooperation in a collaborative computing environment. Our algorithm finds an 
optimized path between reliability and efficiency. Though at the end, reliability is given 
preference (when no matching of trusted node and shortest path is found) over efficiency. 
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Privacy preservation is an important issue in today’s context of extreme penetration of 
Internet and mobile technologies. It is more important in the case of WSNs where collected 
data often requires in-network processing and collaborative computing. Researches in this 
area are mostly concentrated in applying data mining techniques to preserve the privacy 
content of the data. These techniques are mostly computationally expensive and not suitable 
for resource limited WSN nodes.  
 
With ubiquitous connectivity, people are increasingly using electronic technologies in 
business-to-consumer and business-to-business settings. This in effect helps a third party to 
acquire the confidential and private information from various avenues. Depending upon the 
nature of the information, users may not be willing to divulge the individual values of 
records. This has lead to concerns that the private data may be misused for a variety of 
purposes. Privacy can be defined as the limited access to a person or a process and to all the 
features related to the person or the process. Privacy preservation is important from both 
individual as well as organizational perspectives. For example, customers might send to a 
remote database queries that contain private information. Two competing commercial 
organizations might jointly invest in a project that must satisfy both organizations' private 
and valuable constraints, and so on. In order to alleviate these concerns, a number of 
techniques have recently been proposed to perform the data mining tasks in a privacy-
preserving way, which is called Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM). The research of 
PPDM is aimed at bridging the gap between collaborative data mining and data privacy. 
Privacy-preserving data mining finds numerous applications in surveillance, in-network 
processing, which are naturally supposed to be “privacy-violating” applications. The key is 
to design methods (Sweeney, (2005)), which are effective without compromising on security. 
In the literature, number of techniques has been illustrated to effectively preserve the 
privacy of the source data. One of most popular method is randomization. The 
randomization method is a technique in which noise is added to the data to be privacy-
protected. This is done to mask the attribute values of records (Agrawal, et al. (2000). The 
noise added to the data is sufficiently large so that individual values cannot be recovered. 
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Therefore, techniques are designed to derive aggregated distributions from the perturbed 
data values. Subsequently, data mining techniques can be developed in order to work with 
these aggregate distributions. The randomization method has been traditionally used in the 
context of distorting data by probability distribution for methods such as surveys. There are 
two major classes of privacy preservation schemes are applied. One is based on data 
perturbation techniques, where certain distribution is added to the private data. Given the 
distribution of the random perturbation, the aggregated result is recovered. In another 
technique, randomized data is used to data to mask the private values. However, data 
perturbation techniques have the drawback that they do not yield accurate aggregation 
results. It is noted by Kargupta et al. (Kargupta, et al. (2005)) that random matrices have 
predictable structures in the spectral domain. This predictability develops a random matrix-
based spectral-filtering technique which retrieves original data from the dataset distorted by 
adding random values. There are two types data perturbation. In additive perturbation, 
randomized noise is added to the data values. The overall data distributions can be 
recovered from the randomized values. Another is multiplicative perturbation, where the 
random projection or random rotation techniques are used in order to perturb the values. In 
tune of their argument, we can apply the second technique of masking the private data by 
some random numbers to form additive perturbation. 
 
Our one of the objectives of privacy preserved secured data aggregation falls under the 
broad concept of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) (Goldreich. (2002)). SMC and 
privacy preservation are closely related, particularly when some processing or computation 
is required on the data records. Historically, the SMC problem was introduced by Yao (Yao, 
et al. (2008)), where a solution to the so-called Yao’s Millionaire problem was proposed. In 
general SMC problem deals with computing any (probabilistic) function on any input, in a 
distributed network where each participant holds one of the inputs, ensuring independence 
of the inputs, correctness of the computation, and that no more information is revealed to a 
participant in the computation than can be inferred from that participant's input and output. 
Consider a system model (fig. 4). There are N numbers of source nodes. Each source i owns 
a value xi which it is not willing to share with other parties. Suppose that the sum is in the 
range [0, M]. Our objective is to find out the sum X privately without revealing the private 
data xi, i=1,2, … , N to each other as well as to the server.  
 ܺ � ෍ �௜ே௜ୀ�   
The process is initiated by the server. The server randomly chooses one of the source nodes 
and signals it to initiate the process. The source node first chosen by the server is denoted by 
c1. This node possesses its private data x1 and it generates one random number r1 between 
the range [0, M], which is denoted as r1. It then computes R1. 
 �� �  ��� � ���݉��ܲ  
where P is an arbitrarily large number 
 
After computing R1, the source node c1 performs neighborhood discovery to find out the 
other source nodes it is connected to. This information c1 passes to the server. Server keeps 
the knowledge of the nodes already participated. If the source nodes connected to c1 is not 
already participated, the server randomly chooses one of those non-participated source 
nodes and sends that message to c1. Let this next source node be c2. Now, accordingly c1 
passes R1 to c2.  
The source node c2 computes R2. 
 �� �  ��� �  ���݉��ܲ  
The source node follows the same procedure as c1 and sends R2 to c3. This way cN is 
reached, which computes RN. �ே �  ��ே�� � �ே�݉��ܲ   
The server, when it finds out that all the nodes are participated, it asks the last node to send 
RN to it. Server now directs the first source node c1 to compute the summation as: 
 ܺ �  ��ே �  ���݉��ܲ            
The source node after computing the summation sends that value to the server. The server 
may process it or sends that value for further processing.  
 
Ukil and Sen (Ukil & Sen, (2009)) considers a scenario where data aggregation needs to be 
done in privacy-preserved way for distributed computing platform. There are number of 
data sources which collect or produce data. The data collected or produced by the sources is 
private and the owner or the source does not like to reveal the content of the data. But the 
collected data from the source is to be aggregated by an aggregator, which may be a third 
party or part of the network, where the data sources belong. The data sources do not trust 
the aggregator. So the data needs to be secure and privacy protected. The computation for 
the aggregation is based on the concept of SMC. SMC allows parties with similar 
background to compute results upon their private data, minimizing the threat of disclosure. 
Consider a set of parties who neither trust each other, nor the channels by which they 
communicate. Still, the parties wish to correctly compute some common function of their 
local inputs, while keeping their local data as private as possible. Generally, this problem 
can be seen as a computation of a function f (x1, x2, ..., xn) on private inputs x1, x2, ...,xn in a 
distributed network with n participants where each participant i knows only its input xi and 
no more information except output f (x1, x2, ..., xn) is revealed to any participant in the 
computation. In this case the function is SUM.In this scheme, the property of modular 
arithmetic to recover the aggregated value is considered and data privacy is preserved 
through randomization process. The security part is handled by random key pre-
distribution method which is modified version of (Eschenauer, L. & Gligor, V.D, 2002). The 
scheme is simple in nature with low computational complexity, which makes it suitable for 
practical implementation particularly in the case where the source nodes do not have much 
computational capabilities. 
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broad concept of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) (Goldreich. (2002)). SMC and 
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of the inputs, correctness of the computation, and that no more information is revealed to a 
participant in the computation than can be inferred from that participant's input and output. 
Consider a system model (fig. 4). There are N numbers of source nodes. Each source i owns 
a value xi which it is not willing to share with other parties. Suppose that the sum is in the 
range [0, M]. Our objective is to find out the sum X privately without revealing the private 
data xi, i=1,2, … , N to each other as well as to the server.  
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The process is initiated by the server. The server randomly chooses one of the source nodes 
and signals it to initiate the process. The source node first chosen by the server is denoted by 
c1. This node possesses its private data x1 and it generates one random number r1 between 
the range [0, M], which is denoted as r1. It then computes R1. 
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After computing R1, the source node c1 performs neighborhood discovery to find out the 
other source nodes it is connected to. This information c1 passes to the server. Server keeps 
the knowledge of the nodes already participated. If the source nodes connected to c1 is not 
already participated, the server randomly chooses one of those non-participated source 
nodes and sends that message to c1. Let this next source node be c2. Now, accordingly c1 
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The source node after computing the summation sends that value to the server. The server 
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done in privacy-preserved way for distributed computing platform. There are number of 
data sources which collect or produce data. The data collected or produced by the sources is 
private and the owner or the source does not like to reveal the content of the data. But the 
collected data from the source is to be aggregated by an aggregator, which may be a third 
party or part of the network, where the data sources belong. The data sources do not trust 
the aggregator. So the data needs to be secure and privacy protected. The computation for 
the aggregation is based on the concept of SMC. SMC allows parties with similar 
background to compute results upon their private data, minimizing the threat of disclosure. 
Consider a set of parties who neither trust each other, nor the channels by which they 
communicate. Still, the parties wish to correctly compute some common function of their 
local inputs, while keeping their local data as private as possible. Generally, this problem 
can be seen as a computation of a function f (x1, x2, ..., xn) on private inputs x1, x2, ...,xn in a 
distributed network with n participants where each participant i knows only its input xi and 
no more information except output f (x1, x2, ..., xn) is revealed to any participant in the 
computation. In this case the function is SUM.In this scheme, the property of modular 
arithmetic to recover the aggregated value is considered and data privacy is preserved 
through randomization process. The security part is handled by random key pre-
distribution method which is modified version of (Eschenauer, L. & Gligor, V.D, 2002). The 
scheme is simple in nature with low computational complexity, which makes it suitable for 
practical implementation particularly in the case where the source nodes do not have much 
computational capabilities. 
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 Fig. 4. SMC scheme illustration 
 
The aggregation methods of privacy-preservation are dealt well in (Conti, et al. (2009)). In 
(He, et al. (2007)), He et.al. propose schemes to achieve data aggregation while preserving 
privacy. The scheme they proposed, CPDA (Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation) 
performs privacy-preserving data aggregation in low communication overhead with high 
computational overhead. This privacy-preservation data aggregation policy is based on the 
additive property of the polynomial. The objective of this algorithm is that the server or the 
aggregator can not make out the individual content of the data sent be the sink node. In the 
system model described, the friend pairs‘ data are aggregated together. After receiving the 
aggregated data of all the friend pair the server sends that to the base station. It is shown in 
the Fig. 5. In order to illustrtae this, we assume server/aggregator as node ‘A‘ and two sink 
nodes of the friend pair is ‘S1‘ and ‘S2‘.This algorithm consists of two parts: 
 
1. Value distortion: Let the data values in the sink node S1 and S2 be x and y and z be 
the dummy variable at the aggregator node ‘A‘. In the first step, the 
server/aggregator sends three seeds a,b and c to the friend pairs. Based on that A 
computes 
 ���� � � � ���� �  ����� ���� � � � ���� �  ����� ��� � � �  ���� � �����  
where R1A and R2B are two random numbers generated by A.  
Similarly, S1 computes ����� � � �  ����� �  ������ ���� � � � ����� �  ������ ����� � � �  ����� � ������  
Similarly S2 computes ���� � � � ����� �  ������ ����� � � �  ����� �  ������ ����� � � �  ����� � ������  
where R1S1 and R2S1 are two random numbers generated by sink node S1, R1S2 and R2S2 are 
other two random numbers generated by sink node S2. After that, the calculated, ����  and ����  are sent to sink node S1 and sink node S2 by A, securely as described earlier. Similarly, 
����and ����� are sent to sink node S2 and A by sink node S1 and ���� and ���� and ����� are sent to A and sink node S1 by sink node S2. 
 
2. Value aggregation: After the private data values (x and y) are distorted, all the 
nodes aggregates the values available to them and generates aggregated result. 
Sink node calculates Ψ�� , sink node S2 calculates Ψ�� and A calculates  Ψ�.  
Ψ�  �  ��� � ���� �  ���� � �� � � � �� � ��� �  ���� Ψ��  �  ���� �  ����� �  ����� � �� � � � �� � ��� �  ���� Ψ��  �  ���� �  ����� � ����� � �� � � � �� �  ��� �  ����  
where, �� �  ��� �  ���� �  ���� ��� �� �  ��A �  ���� �  ����. These aggregated results from sink node S1 and sink node S2 are securely sent to the aggregator A. Now, the aggregator has the 
simple task to solve the above equation for (x+y+z) with the knowledge of the values of 
a,b,c and Ψ�  , Ψ��   and Ψ��  . After solving for D = x+y+z, node A internally knows its own data z, so it can find out the result (x+y). 
 Fig. 5. CPDA scheme illustration 
 
The privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme by Conti et al. (Conti et al. (2009)) first 
establishes twin keys for different pairs of sensor nodes in a network. Twin key 
establishment is an anonymous process that prevents each node in a pair from deriving the 
identity of the other node with which it is sharing a twin key. Then, for each aggregation 
phase, it uses an anonymous liveness announcement protocol to declare the liveness of each 
twin key. In the end, during the aggregation phase, each node encrypts its own value by 
adding shadow values computed from the lively twin keys it holds. In this way, the 
contribution of the shadow values for each twin key will cancel out each other and the 
correct aggregated result is finally obtained. Data Aggregation Different Privacy-levels 
Protection (DADPP) (Yao, et al. (2008))) offers different levels of data aggregation privacy 
based on different node numbers for pre-treating the data. This protocol is inspired by the 
work of Shao et al. in terms of different levels of privacy as well as the CPDA in terms of the 
privacy achieving method (Shao et al. (2007)). In DADPP, a hierarchical wireless sensor 
network is first constructed in such that sensor nodes form several clusters each of which 
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other two random numbers generated by sink node S2. After that, the calculated, ����  and ����  are sent to sink node S1 and sink node S2 by A, securely as described earlier. Similarly, 
����and ����� are sent to sink node S2 and A by sink node S1 and ���� and ���� and ����� are sent to A and sink node S1 by sink node S2. 
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identity of the other node with which it is sharing a twin key. Then, for each aggregation 
phase, it uses an anonymous liveness announcement protocol to declare the liveness of each 
twin key. In the end, during the aggregation phase, each node encrypts its own value by 
adding shadow values computed from the lively twin keys it holds. In this way, the 
contribution of the shadow values for each twin key will cancel out each other and the 
correct aggregated result is finally obtained. Data Aggregation Different Privacy-levels 
Protection (DADPP) (Yao, et al. (2008))) offers different levels of data aggregation privacy 
based on different node numbers for pre-treating the data. This protocol is inspired by the 
work of Shao et al. in terms of different levels of privacy as well as the CPDA in terms of the 
privacy achieving method (Shao et al. (2007)). In DADPP, a hierarchical wireless sensor 
network is first constructed in such that sensor nodes form several clusters each of which 
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has a fixed cluster head below the energy efficient Base sation. According to the desired 
privacy level, all nodes within the same cluster are partitioned into multiple groups 
belonging to the same privacy level. Data are pretreated only in the same group and privacy 
levels are defined by the size of groups. The lowest privacy level consists of partitioned 
groups that have at least 3-sensor-nodes. The upper privacy level corresponds to portioned 
groups with 4-sensor-nodes. By analogy, if all sensor nodes of a cluster belong to a single 
group, they consider this case as the highest privacy level. The data aggregation process is 
similar to that of the CPDA. First, original data are pretreated in each group. Secondly, the 
cluster head aggregates all pretreated data. Finally, data are aggregated on the plane of the 
cluster head up to the BS. The hierarchical wireless sensor network is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Although DADPP reduces traffic by partitioning a cluster with n sensor nodes into multiple 
in-networks with pretreatment of groups according to the desired privacy-levels, it suffers 
from the inherent high communication and computation overheads. Furthermore, these 
overheads increase with increasing privacy level. 
 
 Fig. 6. Hierarchical WSN 
 
Zhang et al. (Zhang, et al. (2008)) proposed the Perturbed Histogram-based Aggregation 
(PHA) to preserve privacy for queries targeted at special sensor data or sensor data 
distribution. The perturbation technique is applied to hide the actual individual readings 
and the actual aggregate results sent by sensor nodes. For this, every sensor node is 
preloaded with a unique secret number which is known exclusively by the sink and the 
node itself. Sensor nodes and the sink form a tree. The basic idea of PHA is to generalize the 
values of data transmitted in a WSN, such that although individual data content cannot be 
decrypted, the aggregator can still obtain an accurate estimate of the histogram of data 
distribution and thereby approximate the aggregates. In particular, before transmission, 
each sensor node first uses an integer range to replace the raw data. Next, with a certain 
granularity, the aggregator plots the histogram for data collected and then estimates 
aggregates such as MIN, MAX, Median and Histogram. Although the PHA supports many 
data aggregation functions, it has the following disadvantages. First, the final aggregated 
result is an approximation value of the sensor data rather than the real data. Secondly, the 
PHA requires a large size payload (message/data) because all sensor data need to be 
replaced by an integer range. Moreover, the bandwidth consumption of this protocol 
increases as the number of ranges increases. Finally, storing interval ranges to replace the 
original data consumes a significant amount of memory. To address Privacy-preserving 
Integrity-assured data Aggregation (PIA) for WSNs, recently, Taban et al. proposed four 
distinct symmetric-key solutions (Taban et al. (2009)). In their single aggregator model, an 
aggregator node is used as an intermediary between the user (i.e., a third party) and the 
sensor nodes that aggregates the sensor data and forwards the query response to the user. 
The problem is that the user wants to verify the integrity of the received aggregate value 
whereas the network owner does not want the user to access the original data. Privacy 
Homomorphism (PH) has a special feature that allows arithmetic operations to be 
performed on cipher-text without decryption. This technique is fast and resource-efficient 
for privacy-preserving data aggregation, but it has a limitation that it performs only 
addition and multiplication operations. Before sensor data are sent to the aggregators, they 
are encrypted by using the respective keys of sensor nodes and they are added or multiplied 
without decryption. Concealed Data Aggregation (CDA) (Ferrer. (2002)) is a type of PH 
scheme, which conceals the process of data aggregation in WSN by using Domingo-Ferrer’s 
(DF) approach ( Deng, et al. (2006)). In this protocol, each sensor node splits its data into d 
parts (d ≥ 2), encrypts them by using a public key and transmits them to the aggregator 
node. The aggregator node operates on the encrypted data, computes an aggregated value 
from the data without decryption and sends it to the sink. 
 
Context-oriented privacy protection focuses on protecting contextual information, such as 
the location (Xi. Et al. (2006)) and timing (Kamat, et al. (2007)) information of traffic 
transmitted in a WSN. Location privacy concerns may arise for such special sensor nodes as 
the data source (Mehta, et al. (2007)) and the base station (Jian, et al. (2007). Timing privacy, 
on the other hand, concerns the time when sensitive data is created at data source, collected 
by a sensor node and transmitted to the base station. This type of privacy is also of primary 
importance, especially in the mobile target tracking application of WSNs, because an 
adversary with knowledge of such timing information may be able to pinpoint the nature 
and location of the tracked target without learning the data being transmitted in the WSN. 
Furthermore, the adversary may be able to predict the moving path of the mobile target in 
the future, violating the privacy of the target. Similar to data-oriented privacy, context-
oriented privacy may also be threatened by both external and internal adversaries. 
Nonetheless, existing research has mostly focused on defending against external 
adversaries, because such adversaries may be able to compromise context privacy easily by 
monitoring wireless communication. Within the category of external adversaries, one can 
further classify adversaries into two categories, local attackers and global attackers; based on 
the strength of attacks an adversary is capable of launching. Local attackers can only 
monitor a local area within the coverage area of a WSN, and therefore have to analyze traffic 
hop-by-hop to compromise traffic context information. On the other hand, a global attacker 
has the capability (e.g., a high-gain antenna) of monitoring the global traffic in a WSN. One 
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can see that a global attacker is much stronger than a local one. To further protect the 
location of the data source, fake data packets can be introduced to perturb the traffic 
patterns observed by the adversary. In particular, a simple scheme called Short-lived Fake 
Source Routing was proposed in (Kamat, et al. (2005)) for each sensor to send out a fake 
packet with a pre-determined probability. Upon receiving a fake packet, a sensor node just 
discards it. Although this approach perturbs the local traffic pattern observed by an 
adversary, it also has limitations on privacy protection. Specifically, to maintain the energy-
efficiency of the WSN, the length of each path along which fake data is forwarded is only 
one hop, therefore, an adversary is able to quickly identify fake paths and eliminate them 
from consideration. 
 
Another aspect of privacy preservation is anonymity, where the identity of the origin 
and/or the destination of a conversation is hidden from adversaries unless it is intentionally 
disclosed by the user. Ring signature (Rivest, et al. (2001)) is a signer-ambiguous signature 
scheme, first introduced by Cramer et al in 1994. With ring signature, a set of possible users 
(signers) should be specified and each user should be associated with the public key of some 
standard signature scheme such as RSA. To generate a ring signature, the actual signer 
declares an arbitrary set of possible signers that must include himself, and computes the 
signature of any message by himself using only his secret key and the other’s public keys. 
Ring signatures can be verified by the intended recipient as a valid signature from one of the 
declared signers, without revealing exactly which signer actually produced the signature. 
Ring signatures provide an elegant way to leak authoritative secrets in an anonymous way 
and can be used to solve multiparty computation problems. In the case of anonymous access 
authentication, ring signatures allow a legitimate user to hide his true identity among an 
arbitrarily selected set of other users. The non-linkability of multiple transactions of the 
same user is also well protected. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we present on the issues of security and privacy in WSN. We provide a 
comprehensive study regarding the requirements, different kind of well-known attacks and 
some of the proposed solution to counter the security attacks on WSN. We also emphasise 
on the embedded device security where industry has recently given a lot of attention. We 
have touched upon the concept of trust and reputation based security analysis in WSN. In 
fact, we attempt to make the main focus of this chapter on privacy preservation aspects of 
WSN. It is found that WSN security is well-researched compared to the privacy preserving 
issues. So, our endeavour was to bring that privacy protection problem in WSN. In that 
regard, we have provided detailed description of some of the important schemes and 
present the privacy preservation of WSN both from functional and requirement 
perspectives.  
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